Hangzhou First PV Material puts incumbent encapsulant suppliers under pressure

Hangzhou First PV Material produces ethylene vinyl acetate (EVA) films and flouropolymer back sheets and is located in Hangzhou, Zhejiang province, China. Hangzhou First PV Material has more than 500 employees and sales revenue of $67 million. According to the Hangzhou First PV Material’s prospectus, before 2008, STR Solar, Mitsui Chemicals, Bridgestone, and Solutia (Etimex) were the dominant companies producing EVA film – taking 60% of the global market share. Hangzhou First PV Material exceeded Bridgestone and Solutia, and became one of the top three suppliers in 2008. In 2010, the company claimed 25% of the EVA market share; its primary customers are Suntech, Yingli Green Energy, Trina, and Jinko Solar, some of the largest module manufacturers in the world. The company experienced a net profit growth rate of 252.34%, 346%, and 10.76% in 2009, 2010, and 2011 respectively, according to the company’s annual report. This decelerating profit growth, reaching $94 million in 2011, is due to slower growth in the broader solar market, according to the company. Hangzhou First PV Material priced their EVA film at an average of $2.41/m2 in 2011, including a 37.26% gross profit margin (GM).This price is between $0.4/m2 and $1/m2 cheaper than EVA made in Europe or the U.S. (see the report “Module Cost Structure Update: Path to Profitability” — client registration required). Although market conditions are less than ideal for the greater solar industry, the tight-lipped Hangzhou First PV Material has been able to swim against the current. The company hopes to issue approximately 58.1 million shares on the Shanghai Stock Exchange to raise $179 million to ramp an EVA film production line with an annual output of 180 million m2, a backsheet production line with annual output of 2 million m2, and a PV material research center.

Historically, module manufacturers have chosen encapsulants based on the lowest cost, rather than performance, as long as modules pass IEC and UL certification tests; as a result, EVA has dominated the encapsulant market. Still, silicones, thermoplastics, and polyolefin encapsulants continue to compete with EVA. Dow Chemical started production of its ENLIGHT polyolefin encapsulant (client registration required) in Thailand in August aiming to replace EVA. Similarly, Wacker Chemie has rolled out a silicone-based thermoplastic film that claims better transparency and faster lamination times at a similar price to incumbent EVA suppliers (i.e., $3/m2 to 3.50/m2). While encapsulant suppliers with alternatives to EVA claim better performance and/or faster lamination times, success will ultimately come down to cost and how easy it is for module manufacturers to transition from EVA to the new encapsulant. Polyolefins have potential to be less expensive than EVA and Wacker’s silicone-based film can increase efficiency – which can reduce the overall cost-per-watt of the module – but capacity needs to ramp up in locations near module manufacturers to compete with players like Hangzhou First PV Material.

M&A activity brightens among solar thermal developers, as photovoltaic IPOs dim

Early February saw 2010′s first concentration of M&A activity in the solar market. First, French nuclear power giant Areva acquired Ausra, a linear Fresnel lens solar thermal plant equipment supplier. Ausra struggled in early 2009 as investment in solar thermal installations all but halted (see the February 5, 2009 LRSJ – client registration required), and changed focus from a power plant developer to an equipment provider. The company was rumored to be up for sale since mid-2009. The Areva-Ausra match-up could breathe life into Ausra’s low-cost solar plant technology, and use the experience and reach of Areva’s power plant equipment business to push forward solar thermal installations.

Meanwhile, dish Stirling solar thermal technology developer Infinia raised $11.5 million in an equity financing round. This follows a $50 million capital raise mid-2009, and a $58 million raise in April 2008. Infinia competes directly with Stirling Energy Systems, which received $100 million in financing from NTR in May 2008.

The hoard of cash flowing into solar thermal component developers follows the acquisition of leading parabolic trough technology provider Solel by Siemens for $418 million in October 2009. But two questions remain.

First, who’s next to buy? Large component firms, including energy and defense firms, may see a strong fit between their competencies and the large-scale, highly regulated processes required for solar thermal plant execution. As for targets, we’ll keep our eyes on three firms:

  • Heliostat and power tower developer BrightSource Energy, which continues to execute in plant development
  • Linear Fresnel lens and parabolic trough developer SkyFuel, which offers a lower-cost technology option and potentially lower price tag, and
  • Power tower technology developer eSolar, which recently signed a licensing agreement for a 2 GW facility in China

The second question is tougher to answer. Where is all that solar thermal set to go? While 50 MW plant installations continue in Spain, regulatory issues continue to dog the U.S. market (see also the January 7, 2010 LRSJ – client registration required). Clients should expect large-scale wrangling among new solar thermal owners as they push through complex solar thermal projects and offer the reliability, and balance sheet, needed to get the huge projects off the ground.

All of this stands in sharp contrast to IPO activity among photovoltaic technology firms. In Q4 2009, Trony Solar indefinitely postponed its IPO followed by Daqo, a Chinese polysilicon producer, which filed (see the January 21, 2010 LRSJ – client registration required), then lowered, and then in January postponed its IPO. Then, earlier this month, Jinko Solar – a vertically integrated ingot, wafer, and cell producer, joined the list and withdrew its IPO due to “poor market conditions.”

Even the completed IPO of U.S.-based STR Holdings in Q4 2009 yielded lackluster results after repricing twice in the days ahead (see the November 5, 2009 LRSJ – client registration required).

While the general market slump since the first of the year will put investors off, their greater concern likely lies in the volatility of the subsidy-driven solar market and with good reason. A fresh storm of price cuts and continued margin pressure is brewing for late 2010.

Rating x-Si module makers on the Lux Innovation Grid

lig-c-siCrystalline silicon (x-Si) PV modules comprise the largest and most established portion of the photovoltaic (PV) module market, holding roughly 81% of the global PV market in 2008. These x-Si modules also have significant penetration in all sizes of grid-tied applications – from residential to large-scale utility installations.

A handful of large, top-tier manufacturers dominate the market, but smaller start-ups with differentiated technologies are still entering. As the module oversupply rolls through 2009 and 2010, some crystalline silicon module manufacturers will be at the heart of the shakeout.

Examining the performance of companies in this technology area, we find that:

  • Large corporations with differentiated technologies are among the strongest performers.Many of the highest ranking companies are large corporations that stand out due to top-level high-efficiency products and large corporate backing. Their backing provides support for module warranties, capacity expansions, pricing battles, and technology development.
  • New competition from low-cost manufacturers is driving down the value of European leaders. European module manufacturers with high-quality x-Si module technologies are beginning to struggle as module production becomes increasingly commoditized. Their quality advantage is beginning to slide as new low-cost manufacturers gain access to higher-quality materials, dropping their scores on technical value scale.
  • Even with promising technologies, start-ups face formidable barriers to growth. The most successful pure-play solar firms got an early start in the market, and offer either differentiated technologies, sharp business execution, or both. New entrants to the solar market need more than a novel design or slight technical advantage to succeed. Companies building capacity, especially those based on a novel technology, score lower than those with existing capacity because they must play catch-up with more traditional and established manufacturers. The outlook is increasingly bleak for start-ups with unique technologies that are yet to build production capacity.